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ABSTRACT 
The human rights abuses suffered by detainees held at Guantánamo 
Bay have dominated many of the cases before the United Kingdom‟s 
courts.  The Human Rights Act of 1998, still relatively new to the statute 
book, played a central role in the detainees‟ arguments.  The ultimate 
court decisions, however, often relegate such factors to the background 
of the case.  This article examines why the deciding courts declined to 
develop the law of diplomatic protection on the basis of human rights 
                                               
* Lecturer, Newcastle Law School, Newcastle University, United Kingdom. My 
thanks to Fiona de Londras (University College Dublin), Mairead Enright (University 
College Cork), Roger Masterman (Durham University) and Aoife O‟Donoghue (Durham 
University) for their advice and comments upon earlier drafts of this article. Any errors 
remain my own. 
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concerns, and why such arguments continue to be employed by detai-
nees.  Furthermore, the article assesses why the English courts have 
shown greater receptiveness to arguments similarly grounded in accusa-
tions of inhuman and degrading treatment in relation to later cases in-
volving former detainees challenging the role of the British Government 
in their detention.  
I. INTRODUCTION 
In the decade since the Human Rights Act
1
 came into force, incor-
porating the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)
2
 into the 
domestic legal systems of the United Kingdom, the Convention rights 
rapidly came to eclipse more established domestic sources of individual 
rights against the state.  Even before the Act came into force, Lord Hope, 
one of the most senior appellate judges in the English legal system, rec-
ognized that “the incorporation of the European Convention on Human 
Rights into our domestic law will subject the entire legal system to a 
fundamental process of review and, where necessary, reform by the judi-
ciary.”3  Few cases better illustrate the primacy of human rights dis-
course in English public law than those involving “detainees” held with-
out trial by the United States government in the detention facility in 
Guantánamo Bay.
4
   
After the United States invaded Afghanistan in October 2001, in the 
wake of the 9/11 attacks against the United States,
5
 facilities needed to be 
                                               
1 Human Rights Act 1998, c. 42 (Eng.). The Act became enforceable on October 2, 
2000. 
2 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter ECHR].  
3 R v. Director of Public Prosecutions, ex parte Kebilene, [2000] 2 A.C. 326, 374-
75. 
4 As Joseph Margulies points out, the term “detainee” was adopted by President 
George W. Bush‟s Administration primarily as a means of avoiding suggestions that cap-
tured individuals were prisoners of war under the terms of the Third Geneva Convention. 
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 
U.N.T.S. 135.  See JOSEPH MARGULIES, GUANTÁNAMO AND THE ABUSE OF PRESIDENTIAL 
POWER 255 n.3 (2006).  My use of this term in this article is not intended to add any 
weight to this description of the individuals held at Guantánamo Bay, but rather accords 
to the standard practice of the United Kingdom‟s courts in cases concerning these indi-
viduals.  See also Press Release, White House, Fact Sheet: Status of Detainees at Guanta-
namo (Feb. 7, 2002), http://dspace.wrlc.org/-doc/bitstream/2041/63447/00208.pdf. 
5 Whilst the initial detainees held at Guantánamo Bay were captured in Afghanistan, 
as the “war on terror” developed individuals were seized in countries across the world. 
As Rosa Brooks recognized, this represented a breakdown of “[t]he distinction between 
zones of war and zones of peace-between spatial areas in which the law of armed conflict 
governs and spatial areas in which “ordinary” domestic law and international agreements 
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found in which to hold and interrogate captured terrorist suspects.
6
  The 
temporary Camp X-ray, a part of Guantánamo Bay‟s Naval Base initially 
constructed to house Cuban and Haitian asylum seekers,
7
 was chosen to 
receive these detainees in light of a Department of Justice assurance that 
the site could be considered to fall outside the jurisdiction of the United 
States‟ courts.8  In January 2002, the first detainees arrived.  By April, all 
detainees had been relocated to the permanent high-security structures of 
Camp Delta, which had been hastily erected in the first few months of 
2002.
9
  
In the United Kingdom, reaction to the establishment of these 
Camps was initially muted.  Ministers assured Parliament that detainees 
(including British citizens and resident foreign nationals) “are being 
treated in line with international humanitarian norms, in conditions in 
which security is paramount.”10  A ground swell of dissatisfaction only 
began to develop with the realization that the United States Government 
intended to hold these detainees for an extended period without trial or 
judicial scrutiny.
11
  In July 2003 the British Government dispatched Lord 
                                                                                                         
govern.”  Rosa E. Brooks, War Everywhere: Rights, National Security Law, and the Law 
of Armed Conflict in the Age of Terror, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 675, 721 (2004). The global 
scope of the “war on terror” was emphasized by the disparate locations where British cit-
izens held at Guantánamo Bay were captured.  See At-a-glance: Guantanamo Bay Bri-
tons, BBC NEWS, Mar. 9, 2004, http://-news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/3089395.stm.  
6 Ray Murphy affirms that under Article 17 of the Third Geneva Convention such 
interrogation would be lawful even if the United States‟ Government recognized captured 
individuals as prisoners of war. However, Article 14(4) of the Convention prohibits phys-
ical or psychological maltreatment of prisoners. See Ray Murphy, Prisoner of War Status 
and the Question of the Guantanamo Bay Detainees, 3 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 257, 273 
(2003).  
7 See Joint Taskforce Guantanamo: A historical look at Guantanamo Bay and the 
Northeast Gate, http://www.jtfgtmo.southcom.mil/community/his-tory.html (last visited 
Feb. 24, 2010). 
8 See FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, VISIT TO GUANTÁNAMO BAY, 2006-7, H.C. 44, 
at 86, available at http://www.parliament.the-stationery-off-
ice.co.uk/pa/cm200607/cmselect/cmfaff/44/44.pdf.  Arguments that detainees would 
therefore not be able to instigate habeas corpus claims subsequently failed before the Su-
preme Court in Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004), a case which involved British citi-
zens Asif Iqbal and Shafiq Rasul and Australian citizen David Hicks, and which affirmed 
that the US District Court for the District of Colombia did have jurisdiction to hear ha-
beas corpus cases brought by foreign national detainees held at Guantánamo Bay. 
9 The Washington Post maintains a database of the names, nationalities and current 
status of the 779 individuals who have at any point been held in the camps established at 
Guantánamo Bay. As of January 2009, 198 detainees remain at Camp Delta. See The 
Washington Post, Names of the Detained, 
http://projects.washingtonpost.com/guantanamo/search/ (last visited Jan. 10, 2010). 
10 378 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) (2002) 623.  
11 See Vikram Dodd, Waite: US at Guantanamo acts like my Beirut captors, 
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Goldsmith, then the Attorney General, to express reservations regarding 
the treatment of British detainees, and in particular, concerning the pro-
posed system of Military Commissions.
12
  Whilst Lord Goldsmith did se-
cure a concession that British detainees would not be subject to the death 
penalty,
13
 this “quiet diplomacy”14 could not continue once Lord Steyn 
brought the British judiciary‟s abhorrence of the detentions at Camp Del-
ta to the public‟s attention in his 2003 Mann Lecture.15  He declared that 
“[t]he purpose of holding the prisoners at Guantanamo Bay was and is to 
put them beyond the rule of law, beyond the protection of any courts, and 
at the mercy of the victors.”16  Moreover, he challenged the British Gov-
ernment “to make plain publicly and unambiguously our condemnation 
of the utter lawlessness at Guantanamo Bay.”17  In the aftermath of this 
devastating critique, the then Foreign Secretary Jack Straw was obliged 
to publically announce the United Kingdom‟s opposition to the Military 
Commission process, on the basis that it “would not provide the process 
that we would afford British nationals.”18  
In 2005, the House of Lords
19
 heard a case concerning whether the 
British Government could rely upon evidence procured by torture con-
ducted in a third state and in which the United Kingdom was not compli-
cit.
20
  Maintaining the judicial pressure with regard to Guantánamo, Lord 
Hope observed in his judgment that some of the practices authorized at 
Camp Delta “would shock the conscience if they were ever to be autho-
                                                                                                         
GUARDIAN, Mar. 5, 2004, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/20-
04/mar/05/humanrights.world. 
12 See Press Release, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Attorney General to visit 
Washington to discuss Guantanamo Bay Detainees (Jul. 18, 2003), available at 
http://www.fco.gov.uk/resources/en/press-release/2003/08/-
fco_npr_180703_attgenguantanamo.  
13 As Lord Steyn archly observes, such differential treatment of British detainees 
would have been openly discriminatory; “This gives a new dimension to the concept of 
„most favoured nation‟ treatment in international law. How could it be morally defensible 
to discriminate in this way between individual prisoners?” Johan Steyn, Guantánamo 
Bay: The Legal Black Hole, 53 INT‟L & COMP. L.Q. 1, 9 (2004). 
14 Baroness Scotland preferred to characterize these efforts as “robust diplomacy” in 
parliamentary debates. 658 PARL. DEB., H.L. (6th ser.) (2004) 128.  
15 Steyn, supra note 13. 
16 Id. at 8. 
17 Id. at 15. 
18 418 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) (2004) 142.  
19 At this time the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords was the highest do-
mestic court in the English legal system. In October 2009, the jurisdiction of the House of 
Lords was transferred to the newly constituted United Kingdom Supreme Court under 
Constitutional Reform Act 2005.  See Constitutional Reform Act, 2005, c. 4, § 40 (Eng.).   
20 A v. Sec‟y of State for the Home Dep‟t, [2005] UKHL 71 (Eng.). 
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rized for use in our own country.”21  In light of this sustained criticism, 
and despite carefully choosing his words in repeated descriptions of 
Guantánamo Bay as “an anomaly that has to be dealt with sooner or lat-
er”,22 in March 2006, then Prime Minister Tony Blair finally bowed to 
pressure and asserted that it “would be better that it is closed.”23  
This article examines the importance of cases before the United 
Kingdom‟s courts in influencing this longstanding judicial and executive 
opposition to the United States‟ practice in Guantánamo Bay.  These cas-
es show the impact of the detentions in Guantánamo Bay rippling 
through the English legal system.  The key issue is the varying effective-
ness of the decision by the detainees‟ legal representatives to focus their 
arguments upon allegations that the United States‟ authorities had en-
gaged in human rights abuses against their clients.  Arguments by coun-
sel regarding the maltreatment of these detainees not only amplified the 
English judiciary‟s deep disquiet surrounding Guantánamo, bringing it to 
the attention of the general public, but the prevailing public opinion fed 
back into the tenor of the decisions of the courts.  
The first substantive section of this article examines the decisions in 
Abbasi v. Secretary of State
24
 and Al Rawi v. Secretary of State,
25
 in 
which, respectively, the representatives of detained British citizens
26
 and 
foreign nationals ordinarily resident within the United Kingdom
27
 argued 
that the British Government was obliged to exercise diplomatic protec-
tion by petitioning the United States for their release. The next section is 
devoted to Secretary of State v. Hicks,
28
 in which detained Australian cit-
izen David Hicks argued that the courts should require the British Gov-
ernment to recognize his claim for British citizenship, in the belief that 
                                               
21 Id., ¶ 126.  
22 LIAISON COMMITTEE REPORT, 2005-6, H.C. 709-I, available at http://-
www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200506/cmselect/cmliaisn/709/5112201.htm. 
23 Tony Blair, Prime Minister, Monthly Press Conference (Mar. 16, 2006), available 
at http://www.number10.gov.uk/Page9212.  
24 R  v. Sec‟y of State for Foreign & Commonwealth Affairs, [2002] EWCA (Civ) 
1598 (Eng.), available at http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/20-02/1598.html 
[hereinafter Abbasi]. 
25 R v. Sec‟y of State for Foreign & Commonwealth Affairs, [2006] EWCA (Civ) 
1279 (Eng.), available at http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/20-06/1279.html 
[hereinafter Al Rawi].  
26 See Abbasi, [2002] EWCA (Civ) 1598 (Eng.), ¶ 1. 
27 See Al Rawi, [2006] EWCA (Civ) 1279 (Eng.), ¶ 1. 
28 Sec‟y of State for the Home Dep‟t v. Hicks, [2006] EWCA (Civ) 400 (Eng.), 
available at http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2006/400.html [hereinafter 
Hicks]. 
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the British Government would make more active efforts on his behalf 
than the Australian Government had hitherto been willing to make.
29
  
Thereafter, the final section examines ongoing litigation in Binyan Mo-
hamed v. Secretary of State
30
 and Al Rawi v. Security Service,
31
 where 
the claimants seek to expose the role played by the British Government 
in their detention.
32
  These cases continue to place the British Govern-
ment in the invidious position of opposing the claims of individuals ad-
versely affected by a detention regime which it had repudiated in order to 
uphold its stated security policy and its international support for the 
United States. 
II. PLEADING FOR DIPLOMATIC PROTECTION 
Feroz Abbasi, a British citizen, was captured by United States 
forces during “Operation Enduring Freedom,” the military operations 
that drove the Taliban from power in Afghanistan.
33
  In January 2002, 
Abbasi was among the first prisoners to be transported to Guantánamo 
Bay.  With her son being detained arbitrarily, without access to a lawyer 
or judicial process, Mrs. Abbasi instituted judicial review proceedings 
before the English courts, arguing that they should compel the Foreign 
and Commonwealth Office (FCO) to exert diplomatic pressure upon the 
United States to remedy this situation.
34  
The Court of Appeal condensed 
the submissions of Abbasi‟s legal representative, Nicolas Blake, QC, to 
the argument that:  
Mr. Abbasi was subject to a violation by the United States of one of his 
fundamental human rights and that, in these circumstances, the Foreign 
Secretary owed him a duty under English public law to take positive steps 
to redress the position, or at least to give a reasoned response to his request 
                                               
29 Id. ¶ 1. 
30 R v. Sec‟y of State for Foreign & Commonwealth Affairs, [2009] EWHC (Ad-
min) 2549 (Eng.), available at http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Ad-
min/2009/2549.html. [hereinafter Mohamed]. 
31 Al Rawi v. Security Serv., [2009] EWHC (QB) 2959 (Eng.), available at 
http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/QB/2009/2959.html. 
32 Id. ¶ 7. 
33 Ahmed Rashid provides a thorough overview of Operation Enduring Freedom and 
its aftermath, especially with regard to the efforts of the United States to capture mem-
bers of Al Qaeda. See AHMED RASHID, DESCENT INTO CHAOS: THE UNITED STATES AND 
THE FAILURE OF NATION BUILDING IN PAKISTAN, AFGHANISTAN, AND CENTRAL ASIA 
(2008). 
34 This summary of facts is drawn from the judgment in Abbasi. See Abbasi, [2002] 
EWCA (Civ) 1598 (Eng.), ¶¶ 3-8.  
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for assistance.
35
 
In assessing whether the treatment of British detainees in Camp 
Delta engaged the United Kingdom‟s responsibilities under the ECHR, 
the Court of Appeal first considered the principle established in Bertrand 
Russell Peace Foundation v. United Kingdom.
36
  In this case, the Euro-
pean Commission of Human Rights rejected arguments that, “the Con-
vention can … be interpreted so as to give rise to any obligation on the 
Contracting Parties to secure that non-contracting states, acting within 
their own jurisdiction, respect the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the 
Convention.”37  Furthermore, the European Court of Human Rights has 
confirmed that even the absolute prohibition of torture under the ECHR
38
 
does not oblige contracting states which are not causally connected to 
such treatment to provide any civil remedy for individuals subjected to 
torture by a third state.
39
  In light of these authorities Lord Phillips, giv-
ing the judgment of the Court of Appeal, emphasized the following facts: 
“The United States Government is not before the court, and no order of 
this court would be binding upon it. Conversely, the United Kingdom 
Government, which, through the Secretaries of State is the respondent to 
these proceedings, has no direct responsibility for the detention.”40  
The Court of Appeal therefore concluded that, “we do not consider 
that the European Convention on Human Rights and the Human Rights 
Act afford any support to the contention that the Foreign Secretary owes 
Mr. Abbasi a duty to exercise diplomacy on his behalf.”41 Nevertheless, 
the Court did consider the impact of the Government‟s policy statements 
regarding diplomatic assistance,
42
 as these “indicate a clear acceptance 
                                               
35 Id. ¶ 25. Article 5 of the ECHR provides that “everyone has the right to liberty 
and security of person.” ECHR, supra note 2. 
36 Bertrand Russell Peace Found. v. United Kingdom, App. No. 7597/76, 14 Eur. 
Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 117 (1978). 
37 Id. at 124. 
38 Article 3 of the ECHR provides that “No one shall be subjected to torture or to in-
human or degrading treatment or punishment.” ECHR, supra note 2, art. 3. 
39 See Al-Adsani v. United Kingdom, App. No. 35763/97, 34 Eur. Ct. H.R. 11, ¶¶ 
38-41 (2002). 
40 Abbasi, [2002] EWCA (Civ) 1598 (Eng.), ¶ 67. 
41 Id. ¶ 79. 
42 Most significantly, the ministerial policy statement in LXX BRITISH 
YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 526, 528 (1999):  
At present we consider making representations if, when all legal remedies have 
been exhausted, the British national and their lawyer have evidence of a miscar-
riage or denial of justice. We are extending this to cases where fundamental viola-
tions of the British national‟s human rights had demonstrably altered the course of 
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by the government of a role in relation to protecting the rights of British 
citizens abroad, where there is evidence of miscarriage or denial of jus-
tice.”43  Whilst he acknowledged that these statements “contain no more 
than a commitment „to consider‟ making representations, which will be 
triggered by the “belief” that there is a breach of the international obliga-
tions,”44 Lord Phillips employed them as the basis of a legitimate expec-
tation on the part of the British citizens that the Government will act in 
accordance with this stated policy: 
[The FCO] has indicated … what a British citizen may expect of it.  The 
expectations are limited and the discretion is a very wide one but there is no 
reason why its decision or inaction should not be reviewable if it can be 
shown that the same were irrational or contrary to legitimate expectation.45 
The Court of Appeal‟s recognition that the government‟s pro-
nouncements could constrain its discretion allowed it to review the use of 
the “prerogative power” to afford diplomatic protection.46  Lord Phillips‟ 
cautious tone nonetheless underlines the precariousness of the Court of 
Appeal‟s jurisdiction in this field.  Whilst the prerogative was accepted 
as being generally reviewable in the CCSU case,
47
 in that decision Lord 
Fraser had emphasized that “[m]any of the most important prerogative 
powers … are concerned with control of the armed forces and with for-
eign policy and with other matters which are unsuitable for discussion or 
review in the law courts.”48  
The Abbasi decision, in advancing judicial review into the arena of 
diplomatic relations, seemingly trespassed into the „forbidden‟49 area of 
foreign policy matters which had so concerned Lord Fraser.  In reality, 
not all foreign policy matters are closed to the United Kingdom‟s courts.  
Judges rapidly circumscribed this barrier to judicial review, with Lord 
                                                                                                         
justice. In such cases, we would consider supporting their request for an appeal to 
any official human rights body in the country concerned, and subsequently giving 
advice on how to take their cases to relevant international human rights mechan-
isms. 
43 Abbasi, [2002] EWCA (Civ) 1598 (Eng.), ¶ 92. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. ¶ 106. 
46 Blackburn explains that, “[t]he Crown „Prerogative‟ . . . is the term used to de-
scribe the network of inherent common law powers, privileges and immunities of the 
Crown which have existed since time immemorial and exist by virtue of past de facto 
judicial recognition. R. Blackburn, Monarchy and the Personal Prerogatives, [2004] Pub. 
L. 546, 547-48 (Eng.). 
47 Council for Civil Serv. Union v. Minister for the Civil Serv., [1985] A.C. 374, 
(Eng.).  
48 Id. at 398. 
49 Abbasi, [2002] EWCA (Civ) 1598 (Eng.), ¶ 106.  
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Justice Richards conceding extra-judicially that “recent cases show that 
the forbidden areas of foreign policy and the like are much narrower than 
one might have thought, and that the CCSU case has opened up very 
considerable scope for judicial review in these fields.”50 
One key decision is ex parte Everett, in which Lord Justice Taylor 
asserted that the provision of passports was not an unreviewable question 
of „high policy‟, but rather “a matter of administrative decision, affecting 
the rights of individuals and their freedom of travel.”51  This distinction 
was seized upon by Lord Phillips in recognizing Abbasi‟s procedural le-
gitimate expectations; 
The Secretary of State must be free to give full weight to foreign policy 
considerations, which are not justiciable.  However, that does not mean the 
whole process is immune from judicial scrutiny.  The citizen‟s legitimate 
expectation is that his request will be “considered”, and that in that consid-
eration all relevant factors will be thrown into the balance.52 
The Court of Appeal thus accepted that it was for the Foreign Secre-
tary to decide whether to assist a citizen facing abuses of process over-
seas,
53
 but refused to allow the Minister to make this decision “unless 
and until he has formed some judgment as to the gravity of the miscar-
riage.”54  This position can be compared to the recognition by the United 
States Supreme Court that where the United States‟ Government ex-
pressed concerns that a case might undermine aspects of foreign policy 
the Court would, on a case-by-case basis, assess whether the gravity of 
such concerns warranted the dismissal of the law suit.
55
  In the instant 
case, however, the British Government had not been inactive with re-
gards to Abbasi‟s request.  Not only had the request been considered, but 
FCO officials confirmed to the court that “the British detainees are the 
subject of discussions between this country and the United States both at 
                                               
50 Lord Justice Richards, Gray‟s Inn Reading at Gresham College: The International 
Dimension of Judicial Review (Jun. 7, 2006), available at ht-
tp://www.judiciary.gov.uk/publications_media/speeches/2006/sp070606.htm.  
51 R. v. Sec‟y of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, ex parte Everett 
[1988] EWCA (Civ) 7 (Eng.), available at 
http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/1988/7.html. 
52 Abbasi, [2002] EWCA (Civ) 1598 (Eng.), ¶ 99.  
53 Lord Phillips accepted that international law places no obligation upon states “to 
intervene by diplomatic or other means to protect a citizen who is suffering or threatened 
with injury in a foreign State.” Id. ¶ 69.  
54 Id. ¶ 100.  
55 See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 733 n.21 (2004). 
24  PACE INT’L L. REV. ONLINE COMPANION [Vol. 1:9 2010] 
Secretary of State and lower official levels.”56  The court accepted that 
such activity on Abbasi‟s behalf was sufficient to fulfill his legitimate 
expectations and refused to require that specific representations should 
be made to the United States Government.
57
 
A year after the decision in Abbasi, political pressure, rather than a 
court order, compelled then Prime Minister Tony Blair to broach the sub-
ject of the return of British citizens held at Camp Delta in discussions 
with President George W. Bush while in London.
58
  By January 2005, 
these representations had helped to secure the release of all British citi-
zens.
59
  At this time, however, no representations were made in relation 
to Guantánamo detainees who, whilst not British citizens, had been 
granted leave to remain in the United Kingdom prior to their detention.
60
  
This differentiated treatment was explained on the basis that “the Gov-
ernment [is] not in a position to provide diplomatic protection or consu-
lar assistance to foreign nationals.”61 
Undaunted, three refugees, who prior to their detention had been ac-
cepted as permanent residents of the United Kingdom, launched a judi-
cial review of the government‟s failure to make representations on their 
behalf.  Bisher Al Rawi, an Iraqi national, came to the United Kingdom 
in 1983, whilst Jamil El Banna, a Jordanian national, arrived just over a 
decade later in 1994.  They were detained upon entry to the Gambia in 
November 2002, on the basis of suspected links to international terror-
ism.  In early 2003, Gambian officials transferred these individuals into 
the control of the American military.  The third claimant, Omar Deg-
hayes, a Libyan national, was detained by the Pakistani authorities in 
April 2002, before being handed over to United States forces.  The 
                                               
56 Abbasi, [2002] EWCA (Civ) 1598 (Eng), ¶ 107.  
57 Id.   
58 Sarah Baxter, Guantanamo Bay Britons set for Christmas return, TIMESONLINE 
(London), Nov. 30, 2003, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/-
news/world/article1030164.ece.  
59 Jack Straw, MP, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, 429 
PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) (2005) 173. On January 25, 2005, Feroz Abbasi was, amongst 
the last four British detainees (together with Martin Mubanga, Richard Belmar, and 
Moazzam Begg) to be transferred by the United States authorities to the custody of the 
United Kingdom.   
60 This status is provided for under Immigration Act, 1971, c. 77 § 3(1)(b) (Eng.), 
under which a foreign national “may be given leave to enter the United Kingdom (or, 
when already there, leave to remain in the United Kingdom) either for a limited or for an 
indefinite period.” Where an individual has indefinite leave to remain in the United 
Kingdom her status is roughly equivalent to individuals who are Lawful Permanent Resi-
dents of the United States (“green card” holders).  
61 Lord Triesman, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Com-
monwealth Affairs, 685 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) (2006) 992. 
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United States declared the three men to be enemy combatants and all 
were subsequently transferred to Guantánamo Bay, where they were de-
tained and interrogated.
62
  
With the possibility of these men seeking protection from the coun-
tries that they had fled as refugees providing cold comfort in the cells of 
Guantánamo, they argued that the British Government‟s refusal to assist 
them, when it had successfully petitioned for the release of British citi-
zens, constituted discrimination on the basis of nationality.
63
  Moreover, 
whereas the claim in Abbasi focused on arbitrary detention, the claimants 
in Al Rawi argued that their case was more compelling on the basis of 
their allegations that they had suffered torture at the hands of the United 
States authorities.
64
 
In the Court of Appeal, Lord Justice Laws considered that whether 
the British Government‟s policy of drawing a distinction between British 
citizens and permanent residents in the provision of diplomatic protec-
tion amounted to discrimination depended upon an exploration of why 
such contrasting treatment had occurred,
65
 
 
[I]t may be said there are two possible answers: (1) because they were not 
British nationals - as the appellants say; (2) because they were not persons 
whom the United Kingdom was by the rules of international law entitled to 
protect by means of a State to State claim - as the respondents say.  Each 
answer is in a sense true.  By what principle do we decide between them?66 
Answering this question turned upon an assessment of whether na-
tionals and resident foreign nationals where actually „materially differ-
ent‟67 groups for the purpose of diplomatic protection, permitting diffe-
rential treatment under the Race Relations Act:  
The national and the non-national are in truth in materially different cases 
one from the other for the purpose of the exercise of the right of diplomatic 
protection by means of State to State claims. … The non-nationals have 
been treated differently from the nationals not because of their race (natio-
                                               
62 This summary of facts is drawn from the first instance judgment in the Al Rawi 
case, R. v. Sec‟y of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [2006] EWHC (Admin) 
972, ¶¶ 3-13 [hereinafter Al Rawi (Divisional Court)]. 
63 Race Relations Act 1976, c. 74, §§ 1(1)(a), 19B(1), (Eng.). 
64 See Al Rawi, [2006] EWCA (Civ) 1279 (Eng.), ¶ 16. 
65 See R. v. Immigration Officer, Prague Airport [2004] UKHL 55, (Eng.) (establish-
ing the basis for this test). 
66 Al Rawi, [2006] EWCA (Civ) 1279 (Eng.), ¶ 75. 
67 Race Relations Act, 1976, c. 74, (Eng.) § 3(4). 
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nality) but because one group is entitled to diplomatic protection and the 
other is not.
68
  
Lord Justice Laws therefore ruled that the claimants would have to 
establish that the Foreign Secretary‟s decision to deny foreign nationals 
diplomatic protection “is frankly perverse,” an endeavor which was “ma-
nifestly unachievable”69 on the basis of arguments that they had been 
subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment.  The Court of Appeal ac-
cepted, as it had in Abbasi, that regardless of the gravity of the infringe-
ment of an individual‟s human rights, “the ECHR contains no require-
ment that a signatory State should take up the complaints of any 
individual within its territory touching the acts of another sovereign 
State.”70  As the Divisional Court, which first heard the claim, inevitably 
asserted, “the powerful submissions made on behalf of the claimants 
founder, perhaps uncomfortably and unsatisfactorily, on the rock which 
prevented the Abbasi claim from succeeding.”71  As in Abbasi, such ar-
guments failed to address the British government‟s contention that the 
United Kingdom owed no duty to provide diplomatic protection to the 
world at large.
72
  Therefore, whilst Lord Justice Laws did accept that 
“[t]he prisoners at Guantánamo Bay, some of them at least, have suffered 
grave privations,
73
 this acknowledgement was worth little when British 
government did not dispute that the detainees had been „subjected at least 
to inhuman and degrading treatment,”74 but the claimants could not link 
the British government to those abuses. 
The rejection of the appeal by British resident detainees in Al Rawi 
closed the legal avenues by which they could pursue diplomatic protec-
tion.  Over the course of the next year, however, with political pressure 
on the British government to act on the detainees‟ behalf mounting as a 
result of the attention brought to their plight by this case,
75
  Sadat Sayeed 
foresaw that “their fate will be determined by the outcome of ongoing 
Anglo-US diplomacy.”76  The focus of these cases upon the detainees‟ 
treatment, a strategy which delivered “strong arguments in the context of 
                                               
68 Al Rawi, [2006] EWCA (Civ) 1279 (Eng.), ¶ 78. 
69 Id. ¶ 141. 
70 Id. ¶ 102. 
71 Al Rawi (Divisional Court), [2006] EWHC (Admin) 972, ¶ 96. 
72 Al Rawi, [2006] EWCA (Civ) 1279 (Eng.), ¶ 102. 
73 Id. ¶ 3.  
74 Id.  
75 See Vikram Dodd, Tortuous path out of prison for Guantánamo 3, GUARDIAN, 
Dec. 20, 2007, http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2007/dec/20/-usa.world. 
76 Sadat Sayeed, Guantanamo Bay – Five Years On, 21 J. IMMIGR. ASYLUM & 
NAT‟LITY L. REV. 109, 121 (2007). 
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political debate,”77 goes a long way towards explaining this change in the 
British Government‟s position.  As Philippe Sands, QC, once junior 
counsel in Abbasi, explains with regard to that case: 
The Court‟s judgment added great authority to those who were relying on 
international law to challenge the conditions of the Guantánamo detainees. 
… To a significant extent the judgement of the Court of Appeal has set the 
tone for British public opinion on the issue of Guantánamo.78  
The most prominent example of the impact of the claims was Lord 
Steyn‟s famous excoriation of Guantánamo Bay as “a legal black hole,”79 
which can be traced directly to the submissions of counsel for the clai-
mants in Abbasi, Mr. Nicholas Blake QC.
80
  Furthermore, the Divisional 
Court‟s decision in Al Rawi even prompted Parliament‟s Joint Commit-
tee on Human Rights to review the cooperation of the United Kingdom‟s 
security service with the United States.
81
  Therefore, despite the courts‟ 
refusal to intervene, the claimants‟ assertions of arbitrary detention and 
torture became embedded in the public consciousness in the United 
Kingdom.  In August 2007, an eventual effort on the part of the British 
government in response to this mounting public pressure,
82
 coupled with 
the eagerness of the Bush Administration to lessen the burden of Camp 
Delta, ultimately resulted in the release of most of the United Kingdom 
residents, including all of the claimants who had called upon the United 
Kingdom‟s protection in Al Rawi.83  
If the legal representatives for Abbasi and Al Rawi can be accused 
of playing to the gallery, Lord Phillips‟ judgment in Abbasi attempted the 
more audacious feat of influencing the Federal courts of the United 
States,
84
 which were at the time, engaged in hearing Rasul v. Bush,
85
 the 
                                               
77 Al Rawi (Divisional Court), [2006] EWHC (Admin) 972, ¶ 89. 
78 Philippe Sands, The “Political” and the “Legal:” Comments of Professor Tush-
net’s Paper, 3 INT‟L J. L. IN CONTEXT 319, 322 (2007). 
79 Steyn, supra note 13, at 1. 
80 See Abbasi, [2002] EWCA (Civ) 1598 (Eng.), ¶ 22.  
81 See JOINT COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS, NINETEENTH REPORT, THE UN 
CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE (UNCAT) REPORT, 2005-6, H.L. 185-I, H.C. 701-I, ¶ 
57.  
82 See Press Release, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Guantanamo Bay: Former 
UK Residents (Aug. 6, 2007), http://www.fco.gov.uk/re-sources/en/press-
release/2007/08/fco_hp_npr_070807_guantbayukres (last visited Mar. 1, 2010). 
83 Jamie Doward, Guantanamo Britons could now face control orders, THE 
OBSERVER, Dec. 9, 2007, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/20-
07/dec/09/guantanamo.usa/print. 
84 See T. Poole, Harnessing the Power of the Past? Lord Hoffmann and the Bel-
marsh Detainees Case, 32 J.L. & SOC‟Y 534, 550 (2005). 
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conjoined habeas corpus actions involving British citizens.  Nonetheless, 
as Matthew Happold asserts, “[f]or a transnational judicial conversation 
to happen ... there needs be at least two parties to the discussion,”86 and 
the lack of reference to Abbasi in the habeas corpus judgments of either 
the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals
87
 or Supreme Court 
seemingly supports contention that these overtures fell on deaf ears.  
Lord Phillip‟s judgment was, however, brought to the attention of the 
Supreme Court in several amici curiae briefs,
88
 which focused in particu-
lar upon his acknowledgement that “[t]he United Kingdom and the Unit-
ed States share a great legal tradition, founded in the English common 
law.  One of the cornerstones of that tradition is the ancient writ of ha-
beas corpus.”89  This language is paralleled in the majority opinion by 
Justice Stevens and it is conceivable that it may have influenced the 
court‟s extensive consideration of eighteenth century English authori-
ties.
90
 
III. AN UNEXPECTED CLAIM OF CITIZENSHIP  
 The British government‟s success in securing the release of Brit-
ish detainees had an unexpected side-effect. It prompted fellow detainee 
David Hicks to apply for British citizenship.  Hicks, an Australian citi-
zen, was seized by Northern Alliance forces in Afghanistan in December 
2001 and transferred to Guantánamo Bay a month later.  In the two years 
preceding his capture, Hicks had, by his own admission, “undergone ex-
tensive general and terrorist training, at camps with links to or belonging 
to Al Qaida‟,” activities which, according to the then Home Secretary 
Charles Clarke, were “seriously prejudicial to the vital interests of the 
United Kingdom and which demonstrate disaffection with Her Majesty 
and the United Kingdom.”91  
                                                                                                         
85 Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004).  
86 Matthew Happold, The Detention of Al-Qaeda Suspects at Guantanamo Bay: 
United Kingdom Perspectives, 4 HUM. RTS L. REV. 57, 68 (2004). 
87 Al Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134 (D.C. Cir. 2003).  
88 See, in particular, the briefs submitted by the Bar Human Rights Committee, 
available at http://www.barhumanrights.org.uk/docs/ami-cus_brief.pdf (last visited Jan. 
10, 2010), 17-20, and by the Bipartisan Coalition of National and International Non-
Governmental Organizations, available at 
http://www.jenner.com/files/tbl_s69NewsDocumentOrder/FileUpload-
500/81/AmiciCuriae_Bipartisan_Coalition_National_International_%20Non_Govt_Org.p
df (last visited Mar. 1, 2010), 26. 
89 Abbasi, [2002] EWCA (Civ) 1598 (Eng.), ¶ 59.  
90 See Rasul, 542 U.S. at 482. 
91 Letter from the Secretary of State to David Hicks (Dec. 5, 2005) (reproduced in 
Hicks, [2006] EWCA (Civ) 400 (Eng.), ¶ 5). 
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 In light of Hicks‟ conduct, the Australian Government had not ac-
tively pursued his repatriation with the United States.  After nearly four 
years in Guantánamo he was to be tried before a military commission on 
a number of charges,
92
 including allegations that he was responsible for 
translating training manuals into English.
93
  He therefore sought to quali-
fy for British citizenship, on the basis of his mother‟s birth in the United 
Kingdom,
94
 in the expectation that he would be treated in the same way 
as the nine British citizens who had been released and who had not faced 
charges when they returned to the United Kingdom.  
In response, the then Home Secretary informed Hicks that he would, 
using his powers under the British Nationality Act of 1981, immediately 
revoke any citizenship that he was obliged to grant,
95
 on the basis that 
Hicks‟ actions had been “seriously prejudicial to the vital interests of the 
UK.”96  The power to revoke citizenship on this basis, however, was not 
enacted until a 2002 amendment to the Act,
97
 post-dating Hicks‟ activi-
ties in Pakistan and Afghanistan.  Therefore, the original wording of sec-
tion 40 of the British Nationality Act of 1981 still applied, and this re-
quired the Home Secretary to establish that Hicks had “shown himself by 
act or speech to be disloyal or disaffected towards Her Majesty”98 before 
he could be deprived of his citizenship. 
The conditions in which Hicks was being held again loomed large 
in the case.  In perhaps the most reserved language used by a British 
judge in describing Camp Delta, Mr. Justice Collins recognized the im-
                                               
92 The then Australian Prime Minister, John Howard, declared at a Press Conference 
at the Pentagon that, “Australia is satisfied that the military commission process in rela-
tion to David Hicks, as he is the one Australian held in Guantanamo Bay, will provide a 
proper measure of justice.” United States Department of Defense, Secretary Rumsfeld 
Media Availability with Australian Prime Minister John Howard, Jan. 10, 2010, 
http://www.def-ense.gov/transcripts/tran-script.aspx?transcriptid=3182.  
93 These proceedings were, at the time of Hick‟s case before the English courts, sus-
pended pending the United States Supreme Court‟s decision in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 
U.S. 557 (2006).  In June 2006, the Supreme Court ruled that the Military Commissions, 
as established on the order of President George W. Bush violated international law and 
the law of the United States. Military Order of November 13, 2001: Detention, Treatment 
and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 3 C.F.R. 918 (2002). 
This ruling prompted Congress to pass the Military Commissions Act 2006, Pub. L. No. 
109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006).  
94 British Nationality Act 1981, c. 61, § 4C (Eng.), inserted into the Act by the Na-
tionality, Asylum and Immigration Act 2002, c. 13, § 13(1). 
95 Letter from the Secretary of State to David Hicks (Nov. 9, 2005) (reproduced in 
Hicks, [2006] EWCA (Civ) 400 (Eng.), ¶ 3). 
96 British Nationality Act 1981, c. 61, § 40(2)(a).  
97 Nationality, Asylum and Immigration Act 2002, c. 41, § 4(1) (Eng.). 
98 British Nationality Act of 1981, c. 61, § 40(3)(a). 
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portance of expediting the case on the basis that “the claimant is held in 
what are no doubt far from pleasant conditions.”99  The case, however, 
turned on the substantive question of whether Hicks‟ activities before he 
was granted citizenship could form the basis of a justification for revok-
ing it, with the British Government contending that “[d]isloyalty and dis-
affection may be shown without allegiance as a citizen being owed.”100 
Both the High Court and the Court of Appeal accepted that Hicks 
had a right to be registered as a British citizen and rejected the govern-
ment‟s argument that citizenship thereby granted could be revoked due to 
disaffection and disloyalty evidenced by his past actions.
101
  According 
to Pill LJ, 
[T]he word “disaffected” as well as the word “disloyal” requires an attitude 
of mind towards an entity to which allegiance is owed, or at least to which 
the person belongs or is attached. . . .  To be disaffected is to be estranged 
in affection towards an entity to which one owes allegiance or with which 
one has at least a relationship.  The word is not apt to cover, in relation to 
the United Kingdom, an outsider, whether a German general during the 1st 
World War, or an Australian in Afghanistan in 1990.102 
As a result of this ruling, Hicks had to be registered as a British citi-
zen, with citizenship being granted on July 7, 2006.  In the preceding 
months, however, the British government had worked assiduously to se-
cure the passage through Parliament of the Immigration, Asylum and Na-
tionality Act of 2006.  This Act permitted the removal of citizenship 
from dual nationals, such as Hicks, on the broad basis that “the Secretary 
of State is satisfied that deprivation is conducive to the public good.”103  
Basing this new power to deprive citizenship on the Home Secretary‟s 
subjective opinion of the threat posed by an individual allowed John 
Reid, Charles Clarke‟s successor as Home Secretary, to take account of 
Hick‟s conduct prior to his receiving citizenship.  
This measure constitutes the most egregious displays of “persona-
lized” legislation to be enacted in the United Kingdom in recent years,104 
                                               
99 R. v. Sec‟y of State for the Home Depart. [2005] EWHC (Admin) 2818, ¶ 1 
(Eng.). 
100 Hicks, [2006] EWCA (Civ) 400 (Eng.), ¶ 23. 
101 Id. ¶ 37. 
102 Id. ¶ 32. 
103 British Nationality Act 1981, c. 61, § 40(2), amended by Immigration, Asylum 
and Nationality Act 2006, c. 13, § 56. 
104 One of the few comparable pieces of legislation passed by the United Kingdom‟s 
Parliament is the so-called “get-Scargill” provision, now contained in the Trade Union 
and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act, 1992, c. 52, § 46 (Eng.), which was enacted 
specifically to prevent the flamboyant trade union leader Arthur Scargill from being ap-
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having received its Royal Assent more than three months after the High 
Court had ruled in Hicks‟ favor and having only come into force in June 
2006.  Given that legislation already provided for the revocation of citi-
zenship of any dual national who could be shown, since 2002, to have 
acted in a manner “seriously prejudicial” to the United Kingdom‟s vital 
interests,
105
 Hicks can be seen as virtually the only individual against 
whom such extended powers were necessary.  Such machinations were 
of doubtful worth when it is considered that in his judgment, Lord Justice 
Pill had taken great care to acknowledge that Hicks enjoyed much weak-
er links to the United Kingdom than other British-citizen detainees, and 
therefore that “the Secretary of State, in the exercise of his discretion, is 
entitled to distinguish between the respondent and other British citizens 
at Guantanamo Bay.”106  Had the Government followed this course of ac-
tion, Hick‟s claims would at least have received proper consideration, 
even if they were ultimately rejected.  Instead, a matter of hours after 
Hicks was granted British citizenship, the status was revoked using the 
new statutory powers.
107
 
The Hicks case highlights the paradox inherent in the approach of 
Tony Blair‟s Administration to Guantánamo Bay.  Ministers may have 
been willing to criticize the operation of Camp Delta to a domestic au-
dience, and the government was eventually moved to tackle domestic 
criticism by pursuing the release of both British citizens and residents. 
However, the Government has eschewed actions which would embarrass 
other governments, even to the point of drafting the specific “get-Hicks” 
provision to defeat his citizenship claims. Klein and Barry note that “[i]n 
stripping Hicks of his British nationality and refusing to take action on 
his behalf, it is arguable that the United Kingdom has shown some defe-
rence to the position of Australia in its treatment of Hicks.”108  Nonethe-
less, as they go on to argue, Hicks‟ dual nationality “could have been 
viewed as an increased opportunity to protect Hicks‟s human rights, ra-
ther than as another reason to deny assistance.”109 
Charges were brought against Hicks under the revised Military 
                                                                                                         
pointed as Life President of the National Union of Mineworkers. 
105 See Nationality, Asylum and Immigration Act 2002, c. 41, § 4(1). 
106 Hicks, [2006] EWCA (Civ) 400 (Eng.), ¶ 50. 
107 See Vikram Dodd, Reid revoked citizenship of Guantánamo detainee, GUARDIAN, 
Jan. 11, 2007, http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2007/jan/11/-world.politics. 
108 Natalie Klein & Lise Barry, A Human Rights Perspective on Diplomatic Protec-
tion: David Hicks and His Dual Nationality, 13 AUSTL. J. HUM. RTS. 1, 13 (2007). 
109 Id. at 14. 
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Commission process in February 2007,
110
 but his high-profile battle for 
citizenship in the English courts highlighted just how little the Australian 
government had done on his behalf.  Amid intense public pressure in 
Australia, the convening authority appointed under the United States 
Military Commissions Act of 2006, Judge Susan Crawford, accepted a 
pre-trial agreement with Hick‟s lawyers.  He was allowed to serve the 
remaining months of his sentence in an Australian prison.
111
 
IV. REVEALING A JOINT CRIMINAL ENTERPRISE?  
At the end of George W. Bush‟s presidency, only two former Brit-
ish residents remained in detention at Guantánamo.  In the case of one of 
the men, Shaker Aamer, the United States expressed such serious objec-
tions to his release that in December 2007 the Foreign Secretary had to 
acknowledge that “we are no longer in active discussions regarding his 
transfer to the UK.”112  The other detainee, Binyan Mohamed, an Ethio-
pian national, had been granted exceptional leave to remain in the United 
Kingdom in 2000.  Held in United States custody since his arrest in Pa-
kistan on April 10, 2002, Mohamed alleges that he was subjected to re-
peated torture.  On May 28, 2008, he was charged under the Military 
Commissions Act of 2006 with offences relating to his alleged involve-
ment in planning terrorist attacks, particularly the so-called “dirty bomb 
plot,” against the United States.113  
Whilst the British Government pressed for Mohamed‟s release 
alongside the other British residents,
114
 it refused to make public poten-
tially exculpatory evidence and accounts of his treatment received 
through intelligence sharing with the United States Government.
115
 This 
                                               
110 See Press Release, Alexander Downer, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Phillip 
Ruddock, Attorney General, David Hicks: charges outlined (Feb. 3, 2007), available at 
http://www.foreignminister.gov.au/releases/2007/-joint_ruddock_hicks.html. 
111 See Scott Horton, The Plea Bargain of David Hicks, HARPER‟S MAG., Apr. 2, 
2007, available at http://www.harpers.org/archive/20-07/04/horton-plea-bargain-hicks. 
112 David Miliband, MP, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, 
469 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) (2007) 56WS.  The Government has since confirmed that 
the request for Aamer‟s release still stands. See Ivan Lewis, MP, Minister of State for 
Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, 497 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) (2009) 31W. 
113 This summary of facts is drawn from the judgment in R. v. Sec’y of State for 
Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, [2008] EWHC (Admin) 2048, ¶¶ 5-8 (Eng.). 
114 Indeed, the Divisional Court noted, “the very real efforts made by the Foreign 
Secretary to assist [Mohamed].” Id. ¶ 55. 
115 The Divisional Court quoted at length from a letter between the British govern-
ment and Mohamed‟s legal team which explained the nature of the material held by the 
government; “The Government has previously said to you ... that it had no information to 
confirm Binyan Mohamed‟s account of his detention following his arrest in Pakistan or 
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assertion of “public interest immunity,” a doctrine in the United King-
dom‟s public law which is intended to maintain the secrecy of important 
documents, particularly where there are security implications in their re-
lease, was initially upheld by the Divisional Court.
116
  Indeed, the first 
judgment in Mohamed was much more reticent about the claimant‟s as-
sertions of ill treatment than previous courts had been when deciding 
upon cases involving Guantánamo detainees.  Lord Justice Thomas noted 
that “we are satisfied that there is only the slenderest evidence indepen-
dent of [Mohamed] to support his case of torture or cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment by the United States authorities.”117  
This acknowledgement that the protected documents included some 
evidence supporting Mohamed‟s claims that he had been tortured re-
mained significant.  On the basis of closed evidence presented by a 
member of the United Kingdom‟s Security Services, Witness B, the Di-
visional Court accepted that “[t]he [Security Services] continued to faci-
litate the interviewing of [Mohamed] by providing information and ques-
tions … in the knowledge of what had been reported to them in relation 
to the conditions of his detention and treatment,” and they continued to 
do so “when they must also have appreciated that he was not in a United 
States facility and that the facility in which he was being detained and 
questioned was that of a foreign government.”118  Lord Justice Thomas 
concluded that “the relationship of the United Kingdom Government to 
the United States authorities in connection with [Mohamed] was far 
beyond that of a bystander or witness to the alleged wrongdoing.”119 
 Several judgments later, Mohamed still did have access to the 
documents that he originally sought.
120
 New fuel was provided for the 
                                                                                                         
his allegations of mistreatment while in detention. In the light of your correspondence 
and the related judicial review proceedings, all the various branches of the Government 
have recently undertaken a further review of the material held on their files. In the course 
of this review, some limited additional material was discovered. While this material may 
not have a bearing on the charges preferred against Binyan Mohamed, and may not be 
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be relevant under [the Military Commissions Act] and the accompanying provisions of 
the Manual for Military Commissions.” Id. ¶ 47. 
116 R v. Sec‟y  of State for Foreign & Commonwealth Affairs [2009] EWHC (Ad-
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117 Id. ¶ 102. 
118 See Id. ¶ 88.  
119 Id.  
120 Thorough analysis of the British Government‟s Public Interest Immunity claim 
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litigation in January 2009 when Judge Susan Crawford, the Convening 
Authority for Military Commissions, revealed in an interview that she 
had refused to refer the charges against Mohammed al-Qahtani, a Saudi 
national held at Guantánamo Bay, to a military commission on the basis 
that he had been tortured.
121
  
 Placing emphasis on Judge Crawford‟s comments,122 the judges 
hearing Mohamed continued to reflect the “deep concern”123 for the 
treatment of Guantánamo detainees which had prevailed in the courts 
since Abbasi.  In their fourth judgment in the case, delivered just prior to 
Mohamed‟s release, they asserted the importance of making this evi-
dence public given the subject matter it concerned, 
If the redacted passages containing a gist of what was reported by officials 
of the United States Government were made public that would enable more 
informed and accurate public debate to take place and Governments to be 
held to account.  The fact that the issues raised relate to torture and cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment have a particular resonance …
124
 
Moreover, they affirmed that some of the substance of the redacted 
paragraphs amounted to “a short summary of what was reported to the 
United Kingdom authorities by the officials of the United States Gov-
ernment as to what they say happened to [Mohamed] during his deten-
tion in Pakistan in April and May 2002.”125  Following the lead of the 
Court of Appeal judgment in Abbasi, the Divisional Court sought to ex-
tend its influence to decision makers in the United States.  Emphasizing 
“the long history of the common law and democracy which we share 
with the United States”, Lord Justice Thomas asserted that it was, 
[I]n our view difficult to conceive that a democratically elected and ac-
countable government could possibly have any rational objection to placing 
into the public domain such a summary of what its own officials reported 
as to how a detainee was treated by them and which made no disclosure of 
sensitive intelligence matters.
126
 
                                                                                                         
United Kingdom and the United States, is beyond the scope of this article. The basis of 
such a claim by the British Government can be found in Viscount Simon LC‟s conclusion 
that, “documents otherwise relevant and liable to production must not be produced if the 
public interest requires that they should be withheld.” Duncan v. Cammell Laird & Co., 
[1942] A.C. 624, 636, (Eng).  
121 Bob Woodward, Detainee Tortured, Says U.S. Official: Trial Overseer Cites 
“Abusive” Methods Against 9/11 Suspect, WASH. POST, Jan. 14, 2009, at A1. 
122 See Mohamed, [2009] EWHC (Admin) 152 (Eng.), ¶ 12. 
123 Abbasi, [2002] EWCA Civ. 1598 (Eng.), ¶ 107.  
124 See Mohamed, [2009] EWHC (Admin) 152 (Eng.), ¶ 43.  
125 Id. ¶ 68. 
126 Id. ¶ 69. 
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Although these comments did not have their intended effect, in that 
the United States Government released no new information, the contro-
versy generated by Divisional Court‟s decision directly contributed to 
Mohamed‟s release. The day after its fourth decision was issued, the 
British Government was obliged to acknowledge that “[w]e continue to 
press for Mr. Mohamed‟s return from Guantanamo as vigorously as be-
fore.”127  One week later, following renewed contact between senior offi-
cials in the wake of these comments, the British Government further con-
firmed that the United States Administration had agreed that “Mr. 
Mohamed‟s case should be treated as a priority.”128  Eleven days after 
this statement, Binyan Mohamed was released.
129
 
The case, however, continued after this dramatic turn of events,
130
 
with Binyan Mohamed‟s legal representatives seeking to expose evi-
dence of the United Kingdom‟s collusion in the alleged torture, which 
took place whilst he was within the custody of the United States.  The 
allegations brought to light by the case were so serious that the Attorney 
General has referred them to the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Po-
lice for a criminal investigation against Security Service personnel, 
which commenced in July 2009.
131
  Furthermore, the Divisional Court‟s 
fifth judgment, in October 2009, has since ordered that the information 
contained in the redacted paragraphs of its earlier decision must be res-
tored.
132
  At the center of any future criminal action will be the conduct 
of Witness B, the member of the Security Services who interviewed Mo-
hamed whilst he was detained in Karachi, Pakistan, under the control of 
the United States, after his arrest in April 2002.  The investigation will 
focus on complicity in the offense of torture contained in the Criminal 
                                               
127 Lord Malloch-Brown, Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, 
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128 Id. at WS102.  
129 David Miliband, MP, 488 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) (2009) 18WS.  
130 Richard Norton-Taylor, Peter Walker & Robert Booth, Binyam Mohamed Re-
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131 See Baroness Scotland of Asthal, Attorney-General, 709 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th 
ser.) (2009) WS51. 
132 Mohamed, [2009] EWHC 2549 (Admin), (Eng.), ¶ 108. At the time of this writ-
ing, this judgment was subject to appeal. A powerful panel of judges in the Court of Ap-
peal, made up of the Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales, the Master of the Rolls 
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Justice Act of 1988.
133
  English criminal law also establishes that it is an 
offence for a public official of the United Kingdom to act, whilst over-
seas, in a manner which would constitute an indictable offence if done in 
the United Kingdom.
134
  Analyzing international authorities on what 
conduct constitutes complicity in relation to torture under the UN Torture 
Convention,
135
 Parliament‟s joint Human Rights Committee recently as-
serted that:  
“[F]or the purposes of individual criminal responsibility for complicity in 
torture, “complicity” requires proof of three elements: (1) knowledge that 
torture is taking place, (2) a direct contribution by way of assistance that (3) 
has a substantial effect on the perpetration of the crime.”136 
 This interpretation of the offense of torture would suggest that, in 
taking part in interviews and providing information for use in interroga-
tions, officials such as Witness B would have been complicit in torture if 
they knew that such mistreatment of detainees was taking place.  Even if 
criminal charges do not result, this does not preclude state responsibility 
for torture, should the publication of information required by the Divi-
sional Court in Mohamed reveal the United Kingdom‟s collusion in ac-
tivities is incompatible with the Article 3 ECHR prohibition of torture.
137
  
Indeed, had such evidence been available to the claimants in Al Rawi, the 
Court of Appeal could not have side-stepped questions concerning the 
extra-territorial effect of the ECHR.
138
  
Whilst serving as British Prime Minister, Gordon Brown continued 
to argue that the ECHR does not include “a positive legal obligation to 
report or seek to prevent acts of torture carried out by other states 
abroad.”139 Nonetheless, it is clear that where a state is complicit in 
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another state‟s torture of an individual, this will be actionable.  The type 
of collusion which has been dealt with most frequently by the European 
Court of Human Rights has involved efforts by parties to the ECHR to 
extradite individuals to states where they were at risk of such treatment. 
In Saadi v. Italy the Court held that “[s]ince protection against the treat-
ment prohibited by Article 3 is absolute, that provision imposes an obli-
gation not to extradite or expel any person who, in the receiving country, 
would run the real risk of being subjected to such treatment.”140 
That the concept of state complicity in torture under the ECHR ex-
tends beyond extradition to a state which practices torture can be seen in 
other decisions, such as Al Adsani, where the claimant‟s action against 
the United Kingdom for failing to stop his torture by the Kuwaiti authori-
ties was rejected, but only because “[t]he applicant does not contend that 
the alleged torture took place within the jurisdiction of the United King-
dom or that the United Kingdom authorities had any causal connection 
with its occurrence.”141  
Moreover, the Canadian Federal Court of Appeal has recently ruled, 
in a case involving Canadian officials sharing with the United States‟ au-
thorities the details of an interview with a Guantánamo detainee, that 
such activities amounted to a breach of the detainee‟s right to liberty un-
der section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
142
  Taken 
together these authorities indicate that the United Kingdom‟s involve-
ment or collusion in the detention of an individual in Guantánamo could 
constitute an actionable breach of Articles 3 and 5 of the ECHR, even if 
the actual abuse occurs extra-territorially and at the hands of another 
state.
143
    
Evidence concerning the involvement of the British security servic-
es in events leading up to the detention of Bisher Al-Rawi and Jamil El 
Banna, uncovered after the Court of Appeal proceedings, led Edward 
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Davey, a Member of Parliament, to allege that the “British secret servic-
es were utterly complicit in the arrest and rendition of Bisher and Ja-
mil.”144  On the basis of this evidence, and bolstered by the progress in 
the Mohamed case, these former detainees, together with Richard Bel-
mar, Omar Deghayes, Moazzam Begg, Binyan Mohamed and Martin 
Mubanga, instituted a claim for damages as a result of the collusion of 
the British Government in their detention.
145
 In an initial judgment in the 
case, the Mr. Justice Silber accepted that the government can use “closed 
evidence,” presented by security cleared special advocates, in hearings 
closed to the claimants and general public, in response to this action.
146
 
Mr. Justice Silber did, however, note that “[t]he Judge conducting a 
closed material procedure with the assistance of a special advocate acting 
for the claimant would be carefully scrutinizing whether any documents 
for which [Public Interest Immunity] has been claimed should be dis-
closed to the claimants‟ open advocate.”147  
V. CONCLUSION 
Despite President Barak Obama‟s announcement on January 22, 
2009, of the planned closure of the Camp Delta detention facility in 
Guantánamo Bay
148
 and the release of most of the British residents as 
charted in this article, the litigation surrounding Guantánamo in the Eng-
lish legal system continues to gather pace. This article has indicated that, 
to date, there have been two important “ripple effects” from the deten-
tions at Guantánamo evident in litigation before the English courts.  
Firstly, judicial review actions have been employed to press the 
British Government to adopt a more active stance in opposition to the de-
tentions in Guantánamo Bay. In the earlier Guantánamo cases, when evi-
dence did not directly link the United Kingdom to the detention and 
treatment of individuals, many judges endorsed this aim by the exercise 
of “soft power” rather than ruling against the British Government. Even 
though the British Government won these cases, headline-grabbing 
statements on the arbitrary detention and ill treatment of those individu-
als detained in Guantánamo set the tone of public debate. More recently, 
the tenacity of the Divisional Court judges hearing the Mohamed case 
drew an exasperated response from Jonathan Sumption, QC, representing 
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able at http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/QB/2009/2959.html. 
146 Id. ¶ 92. 
147 Id. ¶ 94. 
        148 See Exec. Order No. 13,492, 74 Fed. Reg. 4,897 (Jan. 22, 2009). 
THE RIPPLE EFFECT: GUANTÁNAMO BAY IN THE UNITED 
KINGDOM’S COURTS                                                                 39 
the Foreign Secretary in the Government‟s appeal against their order to 
disclose the redacted material in their judgments. Before the Court of 
Appeal he argued that the position adopted by Lord Justice Thomas and 
Mr. Justice Lloyd Jones was “in many respects unnecessary and pro-
foundly damaging to the interests of this country.”149 The Divisional 
Court‟s reason for demanding the publication of this information relates 
directly to its importance in potentially revealing the complicity of the 
United Kingdom in torture:    
“In our view . . .  a vital public interest requires, for reasons of democratic 
accountability and the rule of law in the United Kingdom, that a summary 
of the most important evidence relating to the British security services in 
wrongdoing be placed in the public domain in the United Kingdom.”150 
 Secondly, where serious human rights abuses are at issue, the 
English courts have shown a willingness to disregard historic concep-
tions of comity between the courts of different jurisdictions and to assert 
their view of the correct interpretation of law for the benefit of the appel-
late courts in the United States.
151
 In the Abbasi case, for example, with 
United States Government maintaining that the detention of prisoners at 
Guantánamo was lawful, and with the issue still live before the federal 
courts, the British Government argued that the issue was not justiciable 
before the Court of Appeal.
152
 Lord Phillips, however, rejected the appli-
cation of this principle of comity given the seriousness of the human 
rights abuses which were at issue, proceeding on the basis that Abbasi 
was being held “in apparent contravention of fundamental principles rec-
ognized by both jurisdictions and by international law.”153  
Both trends, evident throughout the Guantánamo litigation ex-
amined in this article, highlight the importance of these cases as part of 
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the jurisprudence of the English courts after the Human Rights Act. 
However, it is one thing for these courts to attempt to maneuver the Brit-
ish Government into protecting the interests of detainees, or to seek to 
influence their fellow judges in the United States. As the Guantánamo 
cases involving claims for diplomatic protection have shown, such exer-
cises of “soft power” may take years to have an effect, and it may prove 
difficult to discern the impact of the judiciary‟s position as separate from 
other influences on decision making. The ongoing litigation will require 
the English courts to assess whether the British Government was compli-
cit in the detention and torture of detainees, in circumstances where only 
a direct decision will suffice. This might require the English courts to 
reach uncomfortable decisions with an impact which is very close to 
home.
154
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